The prospects for the Nordic-Baltic (8+3) region are radically different from what they looked like in the late 1980s and the 1990s. This is mostly due to external forces, which are in flux, rather than due to any outstanding internal failures. Let’s have a closer look.
When I became personally involved, trying to garner support for the restoration of independence in the Baltic States – in the late 80s and early 90s – most of us retained a healthy dose of optimism for the future.1 The grounds for our optimism have turned out to be elusive.
I presumed that post-Soviet Russia would somehow manage to become a democracy of a sort. Despite the traumatic transition from a centralized, étatiste economy to a market driven economy, we hoped that some sort of a democratic governance would gradually gain hold. This would include an independent judiciary, free media and the rule of law. As a consequence we hoped that Russia could become a “normal” country – meaning a country that could cooperate with her neighbours, rather than being a threat to their sovereignty.
All those hopes have come to naught. Russia under Putin and his power-clique has reverted back to her deep-rooted authoritarianism. Russia is not a democratic country, but a plutocratic state. Instead of free media, the state orchestrates its propaganda through submissive media. The judiciary is strictly beholden to an all-powerful state.
Although economically weak, the government has channelled a disproportionate share of its limited resources to a military build-up. Dreams of an empire are back. The privatization process á la Rus turned out to be the ‘Theft of the Century’, in the words of the impressive Canadian foreign minister. The foreign policy is revanchist. The aim is to restore the imperial “sphere of influence”. Russia is not going to tolerate Ukraine as a genuinely sovereign state. The power-holders in the Kremlin know that without Ukraine, Russia will be unable to restore her empire. And the Baltic countries will remain under steady pressure. The preponderance of the Russian ethnic minorities in Latvia and Estonia makes direct interference in their domestic affairs a continuous threat.
So far the oligarchs have defied Western sanctions. The political will of Western leaders to maintain harsh sanctions in the long term is questionable.
America the unpredictable
Since the Second World War and all through the Cold War, the United States guaranteed Europe’s security through NATO. This basic premise of Western security is now being questioned by none other than the president of the United States himself. No one could have foreseen this in the 1990s. If the Trump phenomenon comes to remain more than a temporary lax into insanity, it is nothing short of an epoque-making rupture in international relations. The current power-holder in the White House is a corrupt businessman who feels more at home in the company of Russian oligarchs or Arabian oil-mandarines than in the councils of democratically elected leaders. Admittedly, policy statements from the president vary from day to day, and even by the hour; one day NATO is obsolete, but not the next. So, unpredictability is the order of the day.
But at least the president has consistently refused to confirm unflinching support from the US for article 5 – the collective security guarantee of the Western alliance. This not only strengthens the hand of the Kremlin in the current power game in Eastern Europe – if allowed to stand – it simply forces the leaders of the European Union to reconsider the basic premises of European security. Not a small order, by any standard. Does this not affect the traditional policy of neutrality and non-alliance pursued by Sweden and Finland? Will Baltic and East-European leaders be forced to insist on activating a common, European defence and security policy in response?
The eurozone sclerosis
In the early 90s, leaders of the newly independent countries in Central and Eastern-Europe were united across the political spectrum in seeking membership in the European Union and NATO. The primary concern was security within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. NATO was there to provide hard security. The European Union was there to provide long-term prosperity. Now, both those basic premises are being questioned: NATO, because the basic US-security guarantee is being withheld, without the EU responding in any way; and the European Union, because of its failure to deal decisively with the consequences of the post-2008 financial crisis.
Instead of being a step forward in the European integration process, the EMU (European Monetary Union) has turned out to be a force for disintegration. The crisis revealed major structural flaws in the monetary union, which have not been amended.2 The austerity policy, imposed by Germany upon the weaker Member States, has turned out to be an unmitigated disaster. The victims of this ill-conceived policy have suffered a lost decade of economic stagnation and social disruption.
The sad economic performance of the peripheral eurozone countries compares unfavourably with the quick and resounding recovery of Iceland, which suffered a devastating crisis, but rejected EU-type austerity policies in favour of fiscal stimulus, with resounding success. The miserable performance of the eurozone countries and their disruptive social consequences has undermined confidence in the future of the European Union, both within member-states and among those outside. In the case of Iceland, overwhelming support for EU-membership immediately after the crisis has completely evaporated in light of the failure of the current EU-leadership in dealing with the crisis.
This triple menace of Russian revanchist, American opportunist and eurozone disintegrative tendencies, does not abode well for future prospects of the Nordic-Baltic region.
The Nordic Model: Still standing tall
In light of the aforesaid, it may sound paradoxical, but the fact is that the Nordic model is still standing tall. That is even an understatement. It is the only socio-economic model emerging from the ideological conflicts of the last century, which has stood the test of time in the age of globalization. Soviet-type communism has been wiped off the surface of the earth – relegated to the dustbin of history. And unbridled capitalism – or market-fundamentalism of the neo-liberal variety – has only been saved from complete bankruptcy through a massive rescue operation by its arch enemy – The State. And it may be only serving time.
The global financial mechanism, run for the benefit of “maximizing shareholder value”, continues to usurp the real economy and concentrate wealth and income in the coffers of a tiny elite. This system is inherently corrupt and utterly unsustainable. The massive eradication of jobs due to the ongoing technological revolution of automation will ultimately make this financial rentier system unworkable. Underneath the surface deep-rooted social discontent is gathering strength, waiting to erupt, although the manifestations of it are still diverse and incoherent. But we are waiting for the gathering storm.
Amidst those reverse surroundings, the Nordic model has turned out to be surprisingly resilient. The Economist, a staunch advocate of market-liberalism for more than a century, couldn’t conceal its envy. On almost every criteria of socio-economic success, the Nordic countries come out at the top of the class. This is surprising because the neo-lib critique of high taxes making those countries uncompetitive and ultimately technological laggards, devoid of entrepreneurial spirit, had gained much credence. But here we are: Economic growth, productivity per hour of work, technological innovation, participation in the labour market (especially by women), quality of education, social mobility, quality health care, equality of income, affordable housing for all, access to unspoiled nature – a vibrant democracy – you name it, they’ve got it.
This outstanding performance disqualifies the neo-liberal critique in one swoop. The facts speak for themselves.
Why is this solid performance not being emulated by others? Why do our friends across the Baltic Sea not look to the Nordic model to counteract the polarizing effects of their market-fundamentalist policies? Why do the countries of Southern or Eastern Europe, suffering from the devastation of German-imposed austerity, not look to Copenhagen or Stockholm for advice on how to combat systemic unemployment and increasing polarization between rich and poor? Not with-standing the success or failure of the social-democratic parties in the Nordic countries, this is where social-democracy works. In the rest of Europe, it does not. Why?
The Western Nordics: Victims of Climate change?
Nordic cooperation – if you include the western Nordics – encompasses a huge area. Greenland is on a continental scale of its own and the Northern Seas are vast. But the populations are tiny and what is holding us together may be tenuous. Are there any cultural ties between Greenlanders and Icelanders? If so, they are not immediately visible. Is Iceland – still the preserve of our ancient, common Viking-language – a shareholder in the common Nordic model? Having been turned into a laboratory for neo-liberal experiments – with disastrous consequences – Iceland is still reeling from that experience.
In spite of our speedy recovery from the financial crash in 2008, the restoration is based on the same precarious foundation, with the underlying problems unsolved. Our welfare state is in tatters and our physical infrastructure has proven to be wholly inadequate to sustain the tourist boom flooding the country. Continuing with the experiment of the smallest independent currency area in the world is simply too risky for comfort. The business class has turned out to be surprisingly corrupt, hiding their wealth in tax havens to avoid paying their fair share of taxes. Not exactly a description of a Nordic welfare-state.
In the next few decades the fundamental effect of climate change will put the precarious ties holding us together to a severe test. The melting of the ice will not only make rich mineral resources accessible to the world, but also open up the northern sea routes for heavy traffic between the rising Pacific powers and the Atlantic Sea board. Will the tiny population of Greenland be able to assert control over the multinationals, awash in cash, queuing up to exploit their natural resources? Will Iceland be turned into a transportation hub – a new Rotterdam in the High North – for heavy cargo, shipped from the “new workshop of the world” – China and South-East Asia – on its way to America and Europe? Follow the money. Will this gradually lead to an undue influence from China (and perhaps Russia) in this hitherto Nordic region?
And what about the European Union?
None of the countries involved – Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Norway – are members of the European Union. Given the EU’s inability so far to solve their inherent crisis, none of those countries are likely to apply for membership any time soon. That means the European Union does not even have a seat at the table in the Arctic Council, except through Swedish or Finnish representatives. And what about the security dimension in the High North? The United States closed down its naval presence in Iceland in 2006, on the premise that Russia had become a partner for peace.
China is already an active participant in arctic councils – investing heavily in scientific research in the area. The Middle Kingdom is historically known for its long-term thinking. So, everything is in flux.
Norway and Iceland (along with Lichtenstein) still maintain what is left of EFTA (The European Free Trade Association). They manage their relationship with the European Union on the basis of the EEA-agreement from 1994. Both are rich and resource based economies. That explains why Norway has twice rejected membership of the EU; it is also the main explanation why Iceland is unlikely to renew its application any time soon.
The EEA-agreement provides those two countries with full access to the European inner market – without saddling them with the disadvantages of the common fisheries policy – which is an unmitigated disaster – or the European monetary policy (EMU), which is structurally flawed to a fault at German insistence. This means those two countries are under no pressure to seek other arrangements with the EU, in spite of the sovereignty infringement involved (i.e. they receive the rules and legislation, governing the inner market by fax).
The Brexit-Flop and the Future
With British politics out of control – after Mrs. May’s failed bid to strengthen her hand in the post-Brexit negotiations with the EU, the EEA-agreement has once again been presented as the ultimate safety valve, safeguarding the UK’s massive trading interests vis-a-vis the EU. Were this to be so, it indicates how utterly the Westminster government has lost its grip on the course of events after Brexit. And it means a total reversal of declared policy. Immediately after Brexit, the UK government rejected EFTA-membership, since its sovereignty deficit would be wholly unacceptable for a major country like Great Britain. Also, it would involve continued British contributions to the EU-budget, as well as accepting free movement of people and foreign jurisdiction (the ETA-court).
This is a measure of how dismally the British Tories have handled the Brexit affair, if they end up with no alternative but EFTA. On the other hand, EFTA-membership and access to the internal market through the EEA-agreement, would make perfect sense for independent Scotland, were the UK to break up into its constituent parts after Brexit. This is not as farfetched a possibility as it may seem for the time being. Scotland, after all, voted against leaving the EU, and the home government is insisting on Scotland’s rights to maintain access to the inner market. This indeed could become an interesting outcome of Brexit – one of the greatest political flops of recent history.
So, what is the future of Nordic cooperation?
The resilience of the Nordic model points to its strength. The tenuous ties linking the western Nordics to the heartland of Scandinavia in a foreseeable sea of change points to its weakness. The internal division between the hardcore eurozone-members on the one hand, and the reluctant members and outsiders on the other, seems to exclude the possibility of a common path for the future. The dominance of external forces – Russian revanchist policies, the unpredictability of US opportunism, and the debacle of the eurozone crisis still unresolved – all point to a future of uncertainty, in which the security dimension presents the greatest risk.
What kind of democratic model would we prefer
Kristi Raik, Non-resident research fellow at ICDS
Hannibalsson’s broad-scope analysis includes changes that are challenging for the Nordic countries both in the field of security as well as economy, uniting the usual leftist critique against global economy and the eurozone with a sharp judgement of Putin’s Russia that is less common among the European left wing. The general picture he paints is depressing and dreary and reflects the loss of self-esteem that has pervaded the West in the past few years. Juxtaposing the Nordic model with global capitalism and the austerity policies of the eurozone does not take into account the fact that Nordic welfare is built on open economy as well as the fact that all the EU’s northern most states have eagerly supported austerity measures.
We can take heart because two out of three risk factors listed in the article—the US’s role in European security and the future of the eurozone—largely depend on us. Sinking neck deep into pessimism is uncalled for and dangerous. The US still needs allies, and China or Russia is not an option. America’s actions thus far show it will not abandon Europe. Trump has helped Europeans to understand that if we contribute more to European and world security, there’s hope that Washington will remain interested in us as allies. The second problem child, the EU and eurozone, will limp on, indeed has reached safer ground and moved further from the brink of the abyss. Improving the eurozone will continue and the motor that takes the EU into the future—Germany and France—is revving. The third factor, Russia’s revanchism and authoritarianism, cannot be influenced by the West, but we are still capable of protecting ourselves from it. However, should we lose faith in our will and capability to do so, there is truly reason for pessimism.
If the rest of the world has a problem, do the Nordic countries have the solution?
Urve Eslas, Research fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis
If we view Jón Baldwin Hannibalsson’s text as an introduction to the foreign policy strategy of the Nordic countries, intended to articulate the problem, sketch a solution and change political field lines, the text has potential. Strategy can be seen as the art of shifting field lines (as Lawrence Freedman describes in Strategy), and this text wants to strategize: change the balance of powers, factor the Nordic states into the equation as an important variable that may decide the success of the calculation. According to the text, the world has a problem and the Nordic countries hold the solution.
That understanding that the world has a problem and the Nordic countries have a solution is a reasonable approach to change international power structures that may be potentially useful at least for the Nordic countries. However, this view has two weaknesses: it is based on the presumption that the world uniformly understands it has a problem and that the issue has the exact characteristics described in the article. Alas, there are a few premises that are understood in the same way all over the world.
If we leave out Russia from the equation for a moment, the other listed states—the UK and US—are democratic countries, the citizens of which make their decisions independently. Doubting that view would shake the foundations of democracy more than we have space to discuss in this piece, which means that our discussion should be based on the premise that the decisions of these states’ citizens have led to the issue—and, as a result, all parties may not perceive it as such.
The US’s view alone about the issue is multi-faceted—although Donald Trump’s support has significantly waned compared to before the elections, there are still people who think that the international agreements the state entered into in the past are harmful to the US.
The same goes for European states. Brexit may have occurred partly due to lies, and Russia may have had a hand in the emergence of European extremist movements as well as the illiberal tendencies that accompany it (I recommend Anton Shekhovtsov’s newly published book Tango Noir: Russia and the Western Far Right) but even in that case both Brexit and measures that endanger liberal democracy are the result of citizens’ decisions.
Both examples rather support the understanding that seeing the phenomena listed in the article as problems is not as universal as we would like to think.
As with the description of the issues in the article, the positions of parties about other related questions are contradictory. While we in Europe ask what on earth does Russia want, since as recently as half a year ago Russia was the third or fourth problem in line on the US’s table, but the US is still the number one issue for Russia. Europe, in turn, is divided on the basis of perceiving issues. Alas, the Nordic countries are not the central factor for the first, second or third faction.
Nevertheless, the “you have a problem, we have a solution” approach is fruitful in that it has the potential to become a strategy; that is, to shift the international balance of power. Estonia was a small blip on the US radar until they faced cyber and information attacks, and Estonia now has experience and skills related to both. Estonia was able to use that advantage: before, during and after the hearings in the Senate and House of Representatives, Estonia gained standing it did not have before with the decision-makers in the US.
There is no reason why the Nordic countries as a whole could not do the same. Although they each have different angles on the problems, the article indirectly offers a common approach to it: protecting liberal values and adherence to agreements. One of the narratives used in Moscow’s recent information attacks is the following: international relations are like a chapter from the Game of Thrones where neither allies nor agreements matter; the world is tough, stands on the right of the strongest alone and it’s every man for himself. Here is an opportunity for the Nordic countries: they can show that strength lies in the likes of Jon Snow and Samwell Tarly, and that allies are considered important and agreements still stand.
1 The author was leader of the Icelandic Social-Democratic Party (1984-96), Minister of Finance and Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade (1988-95). He was politically responsible for Iceland during the EEA-negotiations (1989-94). He is an honorary citizen of Vilnius in recognition of his active support for the restoration of the independence of the Baltic countries (1988-91).
2 See “What is Wrong with Europe – and Why don’t You Fix It?” – http://www.jbh.is/default.asp?ID=359